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Television production: configuring for sustainability in the digital era 
 
‘While creativity is thriving in the UK, many businesses struggle to make the step 
from executing successful projects to becoming fully-fledged, sustainable creative 
businesses... Despite its reputation for world-class content, the UK has very few 
creative businesses of an international scale (and not enough work has been done 
to understand why). Often, companies that achieve early success are acquired by 
a large international player, rather than building sustainable businesses in the 
UK. While we want the UK to continue to be an attractive country for inward 
investment, it is vital that those companies that want to grow organically have the 
means to do so.’ 
(Create UK, 2014: 6). 
 
Over recent years, transformations have taken place in the structure of ownership of the 
television production sector in the UK and elsewhere across Europe characterized by 
consolidation, takeovers and the growing controlling presence of non-domestic parent 
groups.  This state of affairs has attracted critical comment in the press and been a cause for 
concern amongst policy-makers who, for both economic and societal reasons, are keen to 
see media and cultural production businesses flourish but remain independent and 
indigenous.  Why have patterns of ownership changed and what does this imply for the 
ability of independent production companies to survive and flourish in a more globalized 
and competitive environment for television?  
 
In most countries, the state of health of indigenous television production businesses is 
regarded as a matter of importance partly for economic reasons.   In the UK for example, 
television production forms part of a creative sector that, as noted by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, ‘adds billions to UK GDP each year and supports jobs across the country’ as 
well as strengthening the UK’s ‘infrastructure of innovation’ (Osborne, cited in Olsberg 
and Nordicity, 2015: v).   Ownership structures also matter for socio-cultural reasons.  The 
importance, not least in conveying soft power (Nye, 2004), of any country’s stake in 
globalised cultural production industries is one concern. More fundamentally, it is widely 
supposed that, despite globalisation, identity is still somehow anchored in national space 
and that, given the role of culture (of which television is a part) in reproducing this, the 
organisation and ownership of cultural production industries matters (Schlesinger, 1997).  
So custodianship of businesses that involve creation of cultural outputs and exploitation of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) ‘raise questions that go beyond that of markets and of 
economic value’ (Harvey, 2015).  
 
A recent survey noted ‘seismic’ shifts in ownership in the UK television production 
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industry with only five companies accounting for 45 percent of the sector’s revenues in 
2014 (Parker, 2015: 2).   Production has become an attractive target for US media groups 
such as NBC Universal and Warner Brothers who, since 2008, have acquired a number of 
companies (Ofcom 2015: 13; Paterson, 2017). It is not only international groups but also 
domestic UK broadcasters who have been buying up production assets: ITV has acquired a 
number of large and small UK and US independent television production companies since 
2010 (ibid).   And the trend towards consolidation and takeovers has not been confined to 
the UK (Agnew, 2017).  Warner Brothers for example acquired BlazHoffski in The 
Netherlands and Belgium in 2011 and in 2014 it acquired Netherlands-based Eyeworks 
which has TV production interests in some 15 countries (Tartaglioni, 2014).  To what 
extent do recent restructurings in ownership reflect changes in the sorts of corporate 
configurations (i.e. whether owned by a multinational parent company or whether vertically 
integrated or not) that conduce to success in the television production sector in the digital 
era? 
 
How scale may influence the performance of media companies has been the focus in a 
number of earlier studies (Picard, 2006; Wildman, 2006).  Most literature about the 
relationship between size and success in audiovisual industries focuses especially on 
feature film production and the predominance of the Hollywood major studios which is 
partly attributable to scale and partly to vertically integrated structures, both of which 
contribute to strategies of risk reduction (de Vany, 2003).   As far as TV production is 
concerned, a useful but limited body of earlier research concerns itself with questions 
surrounding strategy, size and performance. Bennett (2015) analyses the status of UK 
production companies and argues that true independence, in the sense of having freedom 
from commercial and government pressures, is an ideal that most ‘indies’ struggle to 
achieve.  North and Oliver focus on manager’s perceptions of the impact of processes of 
consolidation in the sector and note that, in addition to advantages of size and scale, 
individual gain is often seen as a key driver of this process (North and Oliver, 2010).  For 
Esser, the main factors driving US acquisitions of European production companies have 
been the success of European-led format businesses, greater competition for content and 
low interest rates (2016: 3586).  
 
A number of industry reports and studies, often commissioned by UK trade association 
PACT and conducted by consultancies such Oliver & Ohlbaum (2014; 2015) and 
Mediatique (2015), have examined the financial health and performance of independent 
production companies in the UK.  While providing an excellent secondary source of data 
on such variables as industry revenues and profits, consultancy studies are necessarily 
constrained in depth and focus and do not contextualize empirical findings in terms of 
wider landscapes of knowledge and theory.  
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Thus, this exploratory paper extends a currently limited body of work that, in the context of 
creative industries and more specifically the television production sector examines the 
relationship between, on the one hand, expansion, scale and differing sorts of corporate 
configurations (whether owned by a multinational parent company; vertically integrated or 
not) and, on the other, economic performance and capacity to engage in business strategies 
that sustain growth.    The research questions it seeks to address are: What are the key 
factors that conduce to economic success and sustainability in the TV production sector? 
What is the nature of the association between corporate configuration and performance?   
How and why is this relationship changing?  
 
In the context of media industries, the difficulties of defining success and sustainability and 
of pinpointing suitable measures of performance are manifold and well recognized (Wirth 
and Block, 1995).   Although standard measures of financial performance such as changes 
in sales revenues, gross profit margins or return on capital are often relied upon in industry 
analyses, the design of a framework suited to more fully evaluating performance in the 
particular context of the television production sector requires attention to be paid to non-
economic indicators too including for example audiences, awards and critical reception for 
outputs.  
 
Drawing on secondary sources of industry data and from secondary source material from 
interviews with executives in the television industry, this article provides a preliminary 
analysis of critical factors determining business success in the television production sector 
and it assesses how and why scale and corporate configuration are of growing importance 
in the digital era.  This research is part of a wider project on ‘TV Production in Transition: 
Independence, Scale and Sustainability’ funded by the UK Economic & Social Research 
Council (ES/N015258/1).  
 
Success factors in TV production  
 
Early work on key success factors or, as Bullen and Rockart put it, the small number of 
specific ‘key areas where “things must go right” in order for the business to flourish’ 
(1981:7) was carried out in the context of designing management information systems.   
But numerous theorists working in the fields of economics, business management and 
strategy have also addressed questions related to how the performance of firms in any given 
sector of industry is determined by circumstances, factors and/or strategically significant 
attributes (Peters and Waterman, 1982).  One criticism of such studies is that, because all 
businesses are unique, generalisation is difficult.  And the context in which firms operate is 
often dynamic and complex, making it difficult to distinguish and isolate specific success 
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factors reliably.  Establishing causality, as opposed to mere association, between specific 
attributes and success is another problem.  Even so, a great deal of work has concerned 
itself with identifying factors seen as crucial in determining performance and therefore 
having implications for the attainment of competitive advantage on the part of individual 
firms.  Most famously Michael Porter (1979) has produced a typology of skills and 
resources which contribute to competitive advantage.  
 
In this paper, since the role of company configuration in determining performance provides 
a central focus, a useful theoretical starting point is earlier work in economics which, 
building on Coase, examines how marketplaces characterized by uncertainty in transactions 
between the differing vertical stages may well incentivise the development of vertically 
integrated organizational forms (Williamson and Winter, 1993). Such uncertainty is a 
defining characteristic of TV production which implies that there will be natural incentives 
towards vertical expansion in this sector.    
 
Also of value is the industrial organization (IO) approach and, within this, the SCP 
(structure-conduct-performance) paradigm which has frequently informed earlier studies in 
economics of media (Wildman, 2006).  However, the fact that SCP analysis confines itself 
to industry structure and firm behaviour leaves obvious limitations in relation to additional 
and alternative factors which may have an important explanatory value.  In the context of 
media, not only is performance a ‘multi-dimensional’ concept (Wirth and Bloch, 1985) but 
likewise the factors that may determine performance are varied and complex and go beyond 
industry structure.    So, while IO provides a useful overarching framework, it is also 
beneficial to integrate insights from complementary perspectives including, in particular, 
the resource based view of strategic management which highlights specific attributes that 
confer advantage (Barney, 1991) and also strategic dynamic capability (Teece, 2007; Helfat 
and Peteraf, 2011).    
 
Following this general line of approach, this paper argues that, based on preliminary 
analysis of the recent history and circumstances of the UK television production sector, 
three variables appear to be especially crucial in determining performance in this sector in 
the digital era.  These are: capabilities in production; ability to exploit content assets; and 
corporate configuration.  This is not to say that other factors play no role.  Obviously 
environmental issues such as the state of the economy and levels of market competition will 
have a bearing on all players in the sector and whether or not individual firms are well 
managed also makes a difference.  My argument is that, in this industry, three variables are 
especially significant. The first of these - how good the firm is in the core business of cost-
effectively producing content that audiences find appealing – depends in turn on the talents 
or skills and resources of the production company and is what might be viewed as a 
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‘fundamental’ competency (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 1107).  Two additional variables 
that are vital are, first, effective management and exploitation of IPRs and, second, scale 
and configuration of activities.  
 
Evidence to support the view that effective exploitation of IPRs plays a vital role in the 
business performance of TV production companies is to be found in numerous earlier 
reports and studies which point to how a policy intervention in the UK which strengthened 
the position of producers vis-à-vis rights ownership in 2003 has since led to a period of 
marked and sustained improvement in the financial performance of the sector (Doyle and 
Paterson, 2008; Mediatique, 2015; Oliver & Ohlbaum 2015).  Earlier empirical research 
has underlined how judicious use of windowing strategies to maximise returns from content 
assets has been crucial to the success of UK-based leading international production 
companies (Doyle, 2016). 
 
Recent waves of consolidation and of takeovers involving UK and European television 
production companies strongly support the view that, in addition to exploitation of IPRs, 
corporate configuration emerges as another potentially highly decisive success factor in this 
sector.  Of course, these two factors are not unrelated: some ownership configurations are 
more conducive to effective management and exploitation of IPRs than others.  However 
the role that scale and corporate configuration might play in strengthening the business 
performance of television production companies extends well beyond IPR management and 
is more complex, as is discussed below. 
 
 
Why scale, vertical shape and international ownership matters in the digital era 
 
Preliminary analysis that draws on recent secondary source statistical company and 
industry data and material from interviews with leading television production executives 
suggests that a number of themes are especially pertinent to understanding the relationship 
between corporate configuration and performance in the production sector.  Some of these 
overlap and their relative significance may vary from one instance to the next but, broadly 
speaking, the following appear to be key determinants of the interplay between 
configuration and performance in this sector:  
 
Advantages of scale 
 
Economic theory suggests that the presence of economies of scale is usually the main 
incentive which drives expansion and consolidation of ownership in any industry.   When it 
comes to making and supplying television content, a company will not, simply on account 
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of being large, be able to ‘produce at a lower cost per hour than [smaller] companies with 
little or no production infrastructure’ (Ofcom, 2006: 70).   Even so, companies with busier 
production slates and longer production runs are often able to make better and fuller use of 
resources (Hoskins et al, 2004; Ofcom, 2006: 71).   So, fuelled by the ‘public good’ 
characteristics of content which mean that, once initial or ‘first run’ creation costs have 
been covered, facilitating consumption of that content by additional audiences typically 
involves low marginal costs (Doyle 2013), economies of scale are a feature of this business.    
 
Some earlier research has questioned whether it should be assumed that scale always 
confers advantages (Bourreau, Gensollen and Perani, 2002).  Focusing specifically on 
independent producers in the UK, North and Oliver have argued that, whereas both larger 
sized ‘super-indies’ who have ‘scale and financial resources’ and small niche players who 
are ‘streamlined enough’ to eke out a living from a handful of commissions are well placed 
for survival, it is medium-sized television production companies that are likely to struggle 
for a living in an increasingly competitive landscape (North and Oliver, 2010: 35).    
 
However, recent empirical data supports the idea that scale is advantageous, not only for 
large but also for medium sized firms (Oliver & Ohlbaum, 2015: 59). Production 
companies operating with a more sizeable scale of activities (i.e. those with annual 
revenues in excess of £5m) tend to fare better on profit margins than smaller ones and this 
reflects a number of possible sources of advantage, from economies of scale, to improved 
opportunities to build reputation and accrue market power, to being able to invest in 
specialist labour.   So prima facia the economic rationale in favour of strategies of 
enlargement and consolidation in the television sector appears to be well founded.   And 
industry research has identified pursuit of economies of scale as one of the ‘main drivers of 
recent acquisitions’ of production companies by US media groups (Mediatique: 2015: 43) 
 
Market access 
 
However, merger and acquisition activity in the television production sector is frequently 
predicated not on scale advantages per se but rather on strategic motives related to securing 
access to markets.   Faced with increasing competition and encroachment on revenues by 
digital rivals, many broadcasters have sought to diversify vertically upstream by building a 
presence in content creation (Ofcom, 2015:13; Esser, 2016).  JB Perrette, president of 
Discovery argues that, in a world where many distribution channels and points of access to 
content exist, ownership of production has become increasingly important: ‘Good content 
will separate the winners from the losers’ (Perette cited in Sweney, 2014).   The US major 
networks have become ‘laser focused’ on the need to acquire ownership of content creation 
and IPRs in order to sustain ‘maximum control over multiplatform distribution’ (Littleton, 
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2016: 42). This same belief has underpinned UK broadcaster ITV’s strategy of vertical 
expansion through numerous acquisitions of independent production companies (Davies, 
2016).    
 
From the production company’s point of view, a compelling incentive for merging with a 
broadcaster and/ or a larger television company with an international distribution network is 
the promise of assured downstream access to avenues of distribution and, in turn, audiences 
(Noam, 2009).  When leading UK independent production company Shed was taken over 
by Warner Bros in 2011, its chief executive Nick Southgate highlighted the fact that 
Warner is so well networked internationally as a producer and as a distributor as key 
advantages (Busfield and Sweney, 2010). Discussing Sony’s acquisition of leading 
independent producer Left Bank, SPTVI Chief Creative Officer Wayne Garvie declared 
that this acted ‘like a turbocharge’ for Left Bank which ‘suddenly became genuine players 
in domestic market at a level they weren’t before as well as internationally’ (Garvie cited in 
Sweney, 2014).   
 
Potential for improved access to international markets and funding is now a significant 
incentive for vertical and horizontal mergers.  Recent data shows that the proportion of 
income which the UK independent television production sector earned from international 
sales and commissions grew from 19% in 2006 to 30% in 2014 (Mediatique, 2015: 16).  
Albeit that the production sector has tended to draw on international markets and co-
production deals to finance production of content for a long time (Chalaby, 2012), the 
current situation of heightened competition between broadcasters and digital service 
providers such as Netflix has fuelled demand for ‘big statement’ and often expensive 
programmes and, in turn, increased reliance on international sources of finance (Ofcom, 
2015; Doyle, 2016).    For Wayne Garvie, the most significant advantage for a production 
company of being ‘allied and part of a larger company [is that] you can play immediately 
on an international field’ (Garvie cited in Sweney, 2014).  
 
Bargaining power 
 
To build their businesses, producers need to negotiate favourable terms on retention and 
secondary exploitation of IPRs.   But their ability to do so depends to a large extent on how 
market power is distributed along the vertical supply chain that stretches between the 
producer and the consumer (Doyle, 2013: 111).   Historically, broadcasters have tended to 
enjoy positions of dominance in the supply chain and, in turn, substantial leverage in deals 
with producers competing for commissions.  In the UK, regulatory oversight of terms of 
trade in deals between the main terrestrial broadcasters and independent producers has 
helped address this situation since 2003 (Paterson and Doyle, 2008).    However, setting 
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aside such interventions, the bargaining power of individual players in any industry is apt to 
reflect their strategic configuration (Porter, 1979).   
 
Consistent with earlier research which suggests that bigger firms – firms that have scale 
and/or are a subsidiary of a larger and more powerful parent company and that have 
financial resources - are better placed to become important suppliers in the television 
industry and to acquire negotiating leverage in their transactions with broadcasters (North 
and Oliver, 2010: 34), it appears that bargaining power is a significant factor motivating 
recent changes in ownership structures.  Speaking about the advantages of Endemol-
Shine’s recently enlarged scale and structure, senior executives Cris Abrego and Charlie 
Corwin (cited in Littleton, 2016: 42) acknowledge that ‘it all comes down to leverage and 
flexibility in deal-making’.  For Corwin, having the resources to deficit-finance and create 
pilots and series and being the owner of a substantial library of IPRs with production 
subsidiaries all over the world are all competitive advantages and ‘we’ll be able to leverage 
those capabilities into better rights retention’ (ibid).  
 
Ability to manage risk  
 
Bigger firms are better placed not only to acquire negotiating leverage but they also enjoy 
advantages in relation to being able to spread their risks over a number of programme titles 
and differing genres and titles.  Television production is a hit-based risky business and so, 
as with film, companies that have the scale to mitigate risk through operating product 
portfolio strategies will enjoy a competitive edge (Achtenhagen, 2012).   To participate 
successfully in strategies of cost-spreading and cross-subsidization, television companies 
need to be of a certain size and to have ‘a portfolio of programmes of different vintages in 
their inventory’ (Litman, 1998: 135). 
 
Eligibility for policy support 
 
Another issue which, arguably, is pertinent to understanding the relationship between 
corporate configuration and performance in the TV production sector is public policy. 
Policy interventions that are intended, for socio-cultural reasons, to protect indigenous 
production or ‘independent’ productions often confer favourable treatment on companies 
which meet specified criteria related to their ownership structures.  In the UK for example, 
a production company that is not cross-owned by a broadcaster1 will qualify as an ‘indie’ 
and in turn benefit from compulsory access quotas for independent productions on PSB 
channels and also from regulatory oversight of terms of trade intended to ensure that 
producers retain at least some ownership of ‘the intellectual property of the content, which 
is critical in terms of making money from a show’ (Graves, cited in Sweney, 2014) 
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Policy incentives designed to incentivise certain forms of corporate configuration can make 
a difference.  However, at a time when technological and market opportunities are 
changing, the benefits of being a so-called ‘qualifying indie’ may well be outweighed by 
other potential advantages that being part of, say, a large internationally networked parent 
company can bring. Recent re-structurings of ownership in the UK would suggest that this 
is often so (Mediatique, 2015: 34), which in 2015 caused UK regulator Ofcom to review 
the efficacy of prevailing policy supports (Ofcom, 2015), albeit that this subsequently did 
not result in any changes in policy.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In all sectors of the economy, a number of critical success factors exist and firms that lack 
these will be disadvantaged relative to rivals unless they adapt or acquire the competences 
or attributes in question. This article argues that, in television production, changing 
technological and market dynamics have accentuated the importance of configuration – 
scale and corporate structure - as a critical success factor.   This is evidenced by re-
structurings in ownership across European and UK television production sectors 
characterized by greater consolidation, higher levels of vertical cross-ownership and more 
takeovers by non-domestic parent companies, often major US media groups.  
Transformations in ownership are taking place primarily because the nature and extent of 
the advantages that greater scale or adopting differing cross-ownership configurations may 
confer have changed. 
 
In this article a number of themes that centrally determine the interplay between 
configuration and performance in the television production sector are identified and 
examined, namely: advantages of scale, ability to manage risk, market access, bargaining 
power and policy support.  However, at a time of concern about how incumbent TV 
production companies can adjust successfully to advancing technology and how public 
policies ought to change to ensure that independent production continues to flourish in the 
global arena, more systematic and in-depth empirical research is needed to bring about a 
fuller understanding of this complex and changing relationship.  
 
It is not simply the ability of independent production companies to survive in an 
increasingly globalized and competitive environment for television which is at stake here.  
Increased investment interest from multi-nationals in indigenous UK and European-based 
players has potential implications for content and for audiences.  Since television, as a key 
aspect of culture, forms part of ‘an active shaping repertoire of meanings and images, 
embodied in values, myths and symbols that serve to unite’ (Smith, 1998: 187) it follows 
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that the organisation and ownership of television production is of wider cultural and 
political significance.   Some earlier work suggests that consolidation in the production 
sector is unlikely to adversely affect creative processes (North and Oliver, 2010: 32), but 
others are less sanguine (Paterson, 2017: 22).  Esser rightly draws attention to the 
diminished position of (often smaller independent) indigenous production companies who, 
to the extent that they wish to make content that is predominantly oriented towards the 
concerns of domestic audiences, may well ‘struggle to attract funding adequate to compete 
with the high-production-value fare developed and produced for the international market’ 
(Esser, 2016: 3605).  
 
So, with a view to promoting socio-cultural objectives as much as preserving fair and open 
competition, policy-makers too need for a fuller understanding of the relationship between 
ownership and performance in the television production sector and how this is evolving.  
Market access is clearly a major driver of recent mergers and acquisitions but, because all 
stages in the vertical supply chain for television are interdependent, strategies of vertical 
and conglomerate expansion can give rise to concerns about anti-competitive behaviour 
including, for example, ‘refusals to supply essential inputs to rival downstream firms, 
margin squeezes, raising rivals’ costs, exclusivity deals or monopsony in content 
acquisition’ (OECD, 2013: 7). 
 
By scoping and conceptualizing those factors which appear essential to the association 
between corporate configuration and performance, the analysis presented here constitutes a 
first step in preparing the ground for much-needed further dissection through empirical 
research.   Further investigation will be conducted through a forthcoming  ESRC-funded 
project which, through empirically-based interrogation of configuration, strategy, creative 
decision-making and performance, aims to build fuller understanding of how changes in 
technology have altered the corporate configurations which conduce to economic success in 
the production industry and of the challenges surrounding development of a production 
sector that is both economically successful and independent. 
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